Etherfuse Stablebonds on Stellar: CETES, USTRY and the Risks

What Stablebonds are

Etherfuse describes each Stablebond as "a proportional economic claim whose value is based on the net asset value (NAV) of a segregated pool of sovereign-debt assets held in regulated custody". Each token tracks one country's government debt. They are not stablecoins: their value moves with interest rates, and for non-dollar bonds, with exchange rates.

Stablebond	Underlying	Value (rwa.xyz, 2 Oct 2026)	Holders	Fee
USTRY	US Treasury notes	$12.4M	1,777	0.25%
CETES	Mexican federal treasury certificates	$4.6M	5,012	0.50%
TESOURO	Brazilian short-term sovereign bonds	$0.7M	552	1.50%
KTB	Korean Treasury bonds	$0.2M	73	1.50%
GILTS	UK government gilts	$0.1M	51	0.25%
EUROB	Euro-area sovereign bonds	<$0.1M	37	0.25%

Etherfuse's own legal overview describes its commission as tiered between 0.25% and 1.5% depending on the underlying yield, and notes that Mexican financial entities withhold 0.5% of interest. rwa.xyz lists Stablebonds as available to non-US investors. All six are issued on several chains; rwa.xyz lists Stellar for every one except GILTS.

The products are young. rwa.xyz dates CETES to April 2024, USTRY to September 2024, GILTS to October 2024, EUROB and TESOURO to November 2024, and KTB to January 2026. Each is subscribed in its own currency according to rwa.xyz — pesos for CETES, dollars for USTRY, reais for TESOURO, euros for EUROB and USDC for KTB — and minted or redeemed through app.etherfuse.com or Etherfuse's SDK.

How the bond exposure works

A Stablebond does not pay coupons to your wallet. Its NAV, which Etherfuse says reflects reserve assets, accrued income, market valuation and fees, rises as the bonds earn interest, so the token price drifts upward. Redemption happens at NAV under the product's terms, so the return arrives as price appreciation.

USTRY illustrates the mechanics. Etherfuse's app showed it at $1.075851 on 2 October 2026, quoting a 3.25% APY; rwa.xyz shows a 2.97% trailing one-year return. CETES is priced in pesos — MXN 1.183675 per token in the app, with a 5.55% APY — so a dollar-based holder carries MXN/USD risk on top of Mexican rates. The app lists the current issuance as starting on 1 October 2026 with the next maturity on 8 October, consistent with short-dated paper being rolled.

Two consequences follow. First, since the price rises, any oracle or lending market must expect a slowly increasing price, not a fixed $1. Second, NAV can fall: Etherfuse says plainly that "Stablebond NAV is not guaranteed to increase", and lists interest rates, credit spreads, liquidity, fees and taxes as drivers. Secondary-market prices, it adds, may diverge from NAV.

Issuer and custody structure

Etherfuse's asset-security page describes the issuer as a Mexican corporation operating primarily under Mexican law, with a Swiss DLT registration for blockchain transfers. Bonds are held "in administration" at regulated Mexican brokers, which Etherfuse says lets holders claim separation of assets in a bankruptcy. An independent third party issues attestation reports.

• Custodians. Etherfuse names BBVA México, Actinver Casa de Bolsa and Kuspit Casa de Bolsa as custodians, described as Category I regulated Mexican financial institutions. Its CETES page names INDEVAL, Mexico's central securities depository, for custody of the underlying CETES.
• Bankruptcy protection. Etherfuse cites Articles 70–72 of Mexico's bankruptcy law for separation of customer assets, and Articles 242a–242b of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act for the DLT layer.
• Attestations. An independent third party reconciles onchain token supply against custodian statements, according to the same page.

Sources do not fully agree on the details, and that is worth saying. rwa.xyz lists the Stablebond issuer as a "U.S. Corporation" and names Spiko SICAV as USTRY's custodian, while Etherfuse's USTRY page names the US Bureau of the Fiscal Service. We could not reconcile these from public pages; anyone holding a material position should ask Etherfuse directly which entity holds what.

On Stellar, the shared issuing account (GCRYUGD5NVARGXT56XEZI5CIFCQETYHAPQQTHO2O3IQZTHDH4LATMYWC, home domain etherfuse.com) has no authorisation or clawback flags set, per Horizon on 2 October 2026. Unlike Franklin's BENJI, any Stellar account can hold and transfer Stablebonds once acquired; eligibility is enforced at mint and redemption, not on the ledger. Our Stellar RWA explainer covers what those flags do.

How much is on Stellar, and where it trades

On 2 October 2026 Horizon showed about 11.5M USTRY on Stellar (10.4M across 915 accounts plus 1.1M in contracts), worth about $12.4M at NAV, and about 58M CETES (40.1M across 1,152 accounts plus 18M in contracts), worth roughly $3.8M. The main onchain markets are Aquarius pools against USDC.

The USTRY figure matches essentially all of the $12.4M rwa.xyz attributes to USTRY, so Stellar appears to be its main chain. CETES has more holders on rwa.xyz (5,012) but less value.

Aquarius pool (2 Oct 2026)	Reserves	Implied price	Liquidity	Swap fee
USTRY/USDC	1.02M USTRY / 1.10M USDC	$1.076	~$2.28M	0.30%
CETES/USDC	17.8M CETES / 1.16M USDC	$0.0649	~$2.31M	0.10%

The USTRY pool's price matched NAV closely that day. But depth is limited. In a constant-product pool of that size, selling 100,000 USTRY (about $108K) would return about 97,700 USDC, roughly 9% below spot including the fee, by our calculation from the published reserves. Those are the realities of AMM pricing: fine for small trades, costly for large exits. Etherfuse also offers redemption at NAV through its app and SDK, which rwa.xyz lists as "instant", subject to Etherfuse's terms.

Stablebonds as collateral

XOXNO Lending's published mainnet configuration includes an "Etherfuse RWA" market where USTRY and CETES are collateral-only at 60% loan-to-value and a 70% liquidation threshold, with supply caps of 250,000 USTRY and 1.5M CETES. Their USDC LP tokens from Aquarius are listed separately as collateral.

The configuration (configs/mainnet/spokes.json in XOXNO's rs-lending-xlm repository, last changed 22 September 2026) treats Stablebonds cautiously:

• Collateral only. USTRY and CETES cannot be borrowed, so nobody can borrow them to short or manipulate them inside the venue. Borrowable assets in the market are USDC, XLM, EURC and PYUSD.
• Small caps. 250,000 USTRY is about $269K at NAV; 1.5M CETES is about $97K.
• Hard price bounds. USTRY is priced from a three-period Reflector TWAP scaled by USDC, cross-checked against a RedStone "fundamental" feed within about ±5%, and rejected outside a band of roughly $0.98–$1.16.

The same configuration also lists the Aquarius USTRY/USDC and CETES/USDC LP tokens as collateral in a separate "AMM Collateral" market, at 50% LTV and a 60% liquidation threshold, with caps of 500 LP tokens each. They are priced from the pools' reserves, and the feed refuses to price a pool worth less than $1M.

XOXNO Lending itself is small on Stellar: DefiLlama showed about $123K of TVL there on 2 October 2026. For the LP-token side of XOXNO, see borrowing against Aquarius LP tokens.

The cautious design has a reason. In February 2026 the community-run YieldBlox pool on Blend accepted USTRY as collateral and priced it from the USTRY/USDC market on the Stellar DEX. BlockSec's analysis says the attacker cleared normal orders and placed abnormal ones, pushing USTRY from about $1.06 to about $107, then borrowed about 1M USDC and 61M XLM against it. BlockSec called it "a pool-operator (YieldBlox DAO) configuration failure, not a Blend V2 core-contract flaw". The full account is in Blend's 2026 incidents, explained.

Risks, stated plainly

• Rate and currency risk. NAV moves with bond prices; CETES, TESOURO and KTB add exchange-rate exposure for dollar-based holders.
• Issuer and custody risk. Your claim runs through Etherfuse and its custodians. Public sources disagree on some custody details; verify before sizing a position.
• Key management. Horizon shows the Stellar issuing account with a single signer. That is a disclosed fact, not evidence of a problem, but it is a different security model from Franklin's 15-signer multisig.
• Secondary liquidity. Onchain pools hold a few million dollars. Large exits move the price, and a thin market is exactly what made the YieldBlox attack cheap.
• Venue risk. Using Stablebonds as collateral adds the lending venue's oracle, parameters and contracts on top. See RWAs as DeFi collateral.

The takeaway

Etherfuse Stablebonds are a small but genuinely usable RWA on Stellar: freely transferable, priced at NAV, and accepted by at least one lending venue under tight limits. Their size — about $16M of USTRY and CETES on Stellar — and the thin markets behind them are the main constraints. The YieldBlox case is a reminder that the risk is often less in the token than in how others price it.

Sources: Etherfuse, "Stablebonds – Overview" and "Legal Overview / asset security" (app.etherfuse.com/legal), USTRY and CETES bond pages (read 2 October 2026); rwa.xyz asset records (2 October 2026); Stellar Horizon API (asset and account records, 2 October 2026); Aquarius AMM API (pool reserves, 2 October 2026); XOXNO rs-lending-xlm, configs/mainnet/spokes.json and markets.json; DefiLlama (xoxno-lending); BlockSec, "YieldBlox DAO Incident on Stellar: Oracle Misconfiguration Enabled a $10M+ Drain".